A blog dedicated to wargaming, mainly concerned with battles using 6mm toy soldiers set in a variety of different historical periods. "Make the game fit the figures" - Conrad Kinch
Heretical Gaming is my blog about my gaming life, featuring small skirmishes and big battles from many historical periods (and some in the mythic past or the far future too). The focus is on battle reports using a wide variety of rules, with the occasional rules review, book review and odd musing about the gaming and history. Most of the battles use 6mm-sized figures and vehicles, but occasionally 15mm and 28mm figures appear too.
Monday 29 December 2014
A Really Useful Link If You Are Writing WW2 Rules
John D Salt gets another entry in "best forum posts", this time on "The Wargames Website", where he discusses the armour piercing qualities of various weapons and the thickness/effectiveness of armour on many WW2-era AFVs: here and here.
Saturday 27 December 2014
Boxing Day DBA - Mohacs Re-Imagined
My plans for Boxing Day gaming had revolved around Star Wars and Formula De, but "events" got in the way, as is their wont! I did however manage to get a DBA game in, having received a copy of the new version of the rulebook as a Christmas Present:
For the battle, I used the Battle of Mohacs 1526 scenario from Miniature Wargames #2.
I don't have either Hungarian or Ottoman armies, so I used my Wars of the Roses figures. The respective armies used were:
"Hungarians": 3 x Knights, 3 x Light Horse, 2 x Pikemen, 1 x Blades, 2 x Hordes, 1 x Skirmishers
"Ottomans": 7 x Cavalry, 4 x Light Horse, 2 x Bowmen, 3 x Psiloi, 2 x Artillery
The photographs aren't very good, but here goes:
I used the historical tactics of both sides and was rewarded with a pretty similar result: the Hungarian Knights and German Pikemen just aren't quite strong enough to overcome the Ottoman advantages of numbers and terrain. Unusually perhaps, quite a lot of the combats went on for quite a long time with a little to-ing and fro-ing.
The new DBA is similar in gameplay to the old as far as I can tell - although I am sure the veteran players will notice large differences. I would like to say though that the rulebook is brilliant: lots of clear explanatory diagrams and lots of interesting Army lists covering 4000BC upto the early 1500s, with the right amount of historical information without adding pointless fluff/pages. I have found it amongst the best written rules, perhaps not quite as good as Sam Mustafa's offerings, but up at the top. Although a couple of sentences require some concentration, the rules themselves are very short so you don't have to remember how different rules inter-relate and the diagrams are excellent, anticipating the majority of situations likely to arise in a game. I will try and review properly when I've played a few more games and used a few more armies.
For the battle, I used the Battle of Mohacs 1526 scenario from Miniature Wargames #2.
I don't have either Hungarian or Ottoman armies, so I used my Wars of the Roses figures. The respective armies used were:
"Hungarians": 3 x Knights, 3 x Light Horse, 2 x Pikemen, 1 x Blades, 2 x Hordes, 1 x Skirmishers
"Ottomans": 7 x Cavalry, 4 x Light Horse, 2 x Bowmen, 3 x Psiloi, 2 x Artillery
The photographs aren't very good, but here goes:
More or less historical deployment, seen from behind the Hungarian Army. |
On this high-angled shot, you can just make out the large Ottoman reserves hidden behind the crest. |
Those Pikemen did eventually defeat the Ottoman cavalry, but the Hungarian right is under severe pressure from the flanking Ottoman Cavalry and this led to the Hungarians suffering defeat. |
I used the historical tactics of both sides and was rewarded with a pretty similar result: the Hungarian Knights and German Pikemen just aren't quite strong enough to overcome the Ottoman advantages of numbers and terrain. Unusually perhaps, quite a lot of the combats went on for quite a long time with a little to-ing and fro-ing.
The new DBA is similar in gameplay to the old as far as I can tell - although I am sure the veteran players will notice large differences. I would like to say though that the rulebook is brilliant: lots of clear explanatory diagrams and lots of interesting Army lists covering 4000BC upto the early 1500s, with the right amount of historical information without adding pointless fluff/pages. I have found it amongst the best written rules, perhaps not quite as good as Sam Mustafa's offerings, but up at the top. Although a couple of sentences require some concentration, the rules themselves are very short so you don't have to remember how different rules inter-relate and the diagrams are excellent, anticipating the majority of situations likely to arise in a game. I will try and review properly when I've played a few more games and used a few more armies.
Friday 26 December 2014
Peninsular War Campaign - end of December 1808
As a result of space issues, I've transferred the campaign game onto VASSAL until such time as I can set-up the game free from juvenile and feline interference! So, the actual game map of the current campaign situation (asat 31 Dec 1808):
Hopefully this illustrates the main areas of action well:
The main French army pursuing the Anglo-Spanish forces as they retreat from their positions east of Salamanca around the Duoro towards the Southwest.
The advance of Soult to Astorga and the retreat of his opponent, Mahy, into the mountains of Northwest Spain.
The efforts of St-Cyr to reduce the remaining Spanish garrisons in Catalonia, whilst threatened by small Spanish forces advancing up the coast from their bases in Tarragona and Tortosa.
All of the units are on the map, but I'm still working out the best way of showing some of the game markers (especially depots) at the moment. However, this isn't enough of a problem to actually stop me playing, so I'm looking forward to resuming play in the very near future.
The main French army pursuing the Anglo-Spanish forces as they retreat from their positions east of Salamanca around the Duoro towards the Southwest.
The advance of Soult to Astorga and the retreat of his opponent, Mahy, into the mountains of Northwest Spain.
The efforts of St-Cyr to reduce the remaining Spanish garrisons in Catalonia, whilst threatened by small Spanish forces advancing up the coast from their bases in Tarragona and Tortosa.
All of the units are on the map, but I'm still working out the best way of showing some of the game markers (especially depots) at the moment. However, this isn't enough of a problem to actually stop me playing, so I'm looking forward to resuming play in the very near future.
Tuesday 4 November 2014
My First Ever Games of DBA
I have finally got round to playing Phil Barker's DBA (there is a good summary of its philosophy here). I know that there is a new version out v.3, but I played the original version, which until recently was available as a free download from WRG's History Page.
I really enjoyed it, I thought it was very cleverly designed. I used it to-refight Degastan c.606 AD, with a Bernician army taking on a Scots confederation, based on an article written by Guy Halsall for Miniature Wargames #3. The Scots confederation consisted of 10 Spearmen elements, plus an element of Psiloi (skirmishers) and Light Horse. The Bernician army consisted of 7 elements of Warband plus an element of Psiloi. In accordance with the suggestion of the article, I gave a +1 bonus to all the Bernician rolls to reflect their better morale and equipment. I can see that there is a lot of subtlety to the system which only more experience in using all the different troop types can give. I didn't find it that hard to understand the rules, although I did have to concentrate properly upon a couple of sentences.
Interestingly, it played out a lot more quickly than Neil Thomas' One Hour Wargames, probably because of the attritional combat system he uses, whereas in DBA all the results are essentially either retreats or destruction. I liked the simple 'command pips' system, I thought it gives interesting choices (especially as both sides were rolling very low scores!) but I'm familiar with the idea from Horse, Foot and Guns and in slightly different form, the Polemos system (pips plus bidding).
My initial reaction is that DBA is the (slightly) better game by having more period richness, but I need to play more of both games to be sure. The design idea is different anyway, with OHW being firmly aimed at beginners, who will appreciate the more conversational writing style, the wide variety of periods covered, the extra simplicity and all the scenarios. More experienced wargamers might prefer the extra substance and detail in DBA,
I really enjoyed it, I thought it was very cleverly designed. I used it to-refight Degastan c.606 AD, with a Bernician army taking on a Scots confederation, based on an article written by Guy Halsall for Miniature Wargames #3. The Scots confederation consisted of 10 Spearmen elements, plus an element of Psiloi (skirmishers) and Light Horse. The Bernician army consisted of 7 elements of Warband plus an element of Psiloi. In accordance with the suggestion of the article, I gave a +1 bonus to all the Bernician rolls to reflect their better morale and equipment. I can see that there is a lot of subtlety to the system which only more experience in using all the different troop types can give. I didn't find it that hard to understand the rules, although I did have to concentrate properly upon a couple of sentences.
The initial set-up: Bernicians to the south (bottom), Scots' Confederation to the north of the stream. |
Initial position with different angle, to include the last Scots' spearmen and some Bernician archers. |
Interestingly, it played out a lot more quickly than Neil Thomas' One Hour Wargames, probably because of the attritional combat system he uses, whereas in DBA all the results are essentially either retreats or destruction. I liked the simple 'command pips' system, I thought it gives interesting choices (especially as both sides were rolling very low scores!) but I'm familiar with the idea from Horse, Foot and Guns and in slightly different form, the Polemos system (pips plus bidding).
My initial reaction is that DBA is the (slightly) better game by having more period richness, but I need to play more of both games to be sure. The design idea is different anyway, with OHW being firmly aimed at beginners, who will appreciate the more conversational writing style, the wide variety of periods covered, the extra simplicity and all the scenarios. More experienced wargamers might prefer the extra substance and detail in DBA,
Sunday 26 October 2014
Miniature Wargames Scenario - Battle of Teugn-Hausen
The latest issue of Miniature Wargames features a Command challenge scenario written by veteran wargamer Steve Jones based on the Battle of Teugn-Hausen, which took place during the war between Napoleonic France and Imperial Austria in 1809. I've never gamed a battle from this campaign before but I've been fascinated by it ever since I first read a copy of Petre's Napoleon and the Archduke Charles many moons ago.
Details of the scenario can obviously be found in the magazine, but they basically pit an Austrian Corps consisting of two infantry divisions and a small vanguard division against a French Corps of two infantry divisions. The second French division arrives as soon as serious combat begins. The Austrians have a little cavalry and the French have none, but unlike in many rules, the French are not unduly penalized by this in Polemos.
Game Notes: An excellent scenario which I thoroughly enjoyed - I was quite disappointed that the battle led to a relatively early French defeat, but my miniature Davout's ability to fluff the key rolls was uncanny! The French have a key advantage in this scenario - their infantry are much better. In Polemos terms, they are 'Veteran SK2 or SK1' against Austrian musketeers mainly rated as 'Trained SK0'. This basically translates as a +3/+4 advantage on opposed D6 die rolls (the basic combat mechanic of the game). The Austrians maximized their use of the slopes, the woods and mutual support - and were bold enough to take a gamble on offensive action when the opportunity presented itself - and, in this game, were duly rewarded. It was a pity that Davout failed his force morale role when St. Hilaire's division was spent - another key failed roll.
There was a long discussion on The Wargames Website recently concerning historical movement rates. Polemos doesn't really specify time scales, but I think that based on the move distances involved a turn should be considered to be about 5 minutes. The game took 15 turns overall, which seems about right for essentially a divisional action (since the French only got one division into action).
As ever, I really enjoyed using the Polemos Napoleonic rules and they continue to give good games: find my review here.
Update: Austrian Napoleonic expert Dave Hollins has kindly let me know that the terrain is wrong for an historical refight of this battle. I have very roughly sketched the very nice scenario map in the actual magazine so that anyone viewing the blog can see what the terrain should look like according to the scenario writer as I only approximately followed the guidelines (to fit with the first hills that came out of the box...):
Details of the scenario can obviously be found in the magazine, but they basically pit an Austrian Corps consisting of two infantry divisions and a small vanguard division against a French Corps of two infantry divisions. The second French division arrives as soon as serious combat begins. The Austrians have a little cavalry and the French have none, but unlike in many rules, the French are not unduly penalized by this in Polemos.
Another shot of the set-up. |
The view from the Austrian grenzers' position on the central ridge, looking down into Teugn. |
Same position. |
A wider shot of the same situation. |
Which saw the Kaiserliks send the French fleeing back through the trees, their battle over. |
A wider view of the position at this moment. St. Hilaire's division is in some disarray, but he has hopes that his flanking maneouvre may change the situation radically. |
But nothing is going right for the French now. Their veteran light infantry has been held and driven back by the Austrian musketeers! |
Another shot of the same situation. |
The position on the Austrian right (East). Friant's Division never quite got to grips with St Julien's brigades before the rest of the the French packed up. |
There was a long discussion on The Wargames Website recently concerning historical movement rates. Polemos doesn't really specify time scales, but I think that based on the move distances involved a turn should be considered to be about 5 minutes. The game took 15 turns overall, which seems about right for essentially a divisional action (since the French only got one division into action).
As ever, I really enjoyed using the Polemos Napoleonic rules and they continue to give good games: find my review here.
Update: Austrian Napoleonic expert Dave Hollins has kindly let me know that the terrain is wrong for an historical refight of this battle. I have very roughly sketched the very nice scenario map in the actual magazine so that anyone viewing the blog can see what the terrain should look like according to the scenario writer as I only approximately followed the guidelines (to fit with the first hills that came out of the box...):
Grey rectangles = towns; black lines = roads; grey shapes = woods; green/brown lines = contours |
Failed Game
I tried to play a game yesterday but it all turned out quite badly. I'm not really sure why. The scenario seemed interesting (an 1809 scenario from Miniature Wargames). I was giving my Napoleonic Austrians a rare run-out against the French. The terrain looked okay, certainly not worse than my usual offerings. I was using my normal ruleset for Napoleonics - the Polemos set. But for whatever reason, the game just didn't click, I quickly got bored and frustrated and packed it in. Maybe I am jaded with the rules? I don't cosciously feel that. It was very disappointing though, as I'd been looking forward to playing all week - and it didn't feel like I was just not in the mood for gaming, on the contrary I really wanted to play. Perhaps it was the very expectation that caused the problem, I'm not sure. Or maybe it was just a general sense of feeling down.
Anyway, I'm hoping that the stars will align better today.
Anyway, I'm hoping that the stars will align better today.
Friday 24 October 2014
Arnhem Timewaster
I suppose many gamers have battles that somehow fascinate them and like many, I have Operation Market Garden/Battle of Arnhem high on my list. One reason I became interested in it was exposure to a fine computer game about the campaign made in the 1980s and I spent many happy hours playing it on an Amstrad against a mate whilst at school. Anyway, I discovered a version on the internet and I've had a couple of games this week. Obviously everything looks pretty basic, but I found that the addictive gameplay is still there, not least because the solitaire version forces you to play the Allies and their task in some of the scenarios is quite tricky - particularly 1st Airborne Division's mission! I can usually win the other scenarios though and advance the Guards Armoured rather faster than in real-life, so that makes 1st Airborne's task rather easier in those scenarios which cover more of the operation.
Anyway, here is the link if you fancy a game: Arnhem
Anyway, here is the link if you fancy a game: Arnhem
Tuesday 14 October 2014
Peninsular Campaign - Summary of Forces, End of December 1808
Imperial Forces:
VIII Corps (Junot):
16000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 42 Guns (Pamplona)
II Corps (Soult):
28000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, 30 Guns (Besieging Astorga)
Caffarelli’s Division: 4000 Infantry, 6 Guns (West of
Palencia)
Burgos Garrison: 2000 Infantry
Army of Spain (Joseph Napoleon):
6000 Guardsmen, 2000 Guard Cavaly, 12 Guns (Tordesillas)
San Sebastian Garrison: 2000 Infantry
Pamplona Garrison: 2000 Infantry
Tudela Garrison: 1000 Infantry
Zaragoza Garrison: 4000 Infantry
I Corps (Marchand):
16000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, 48 Guns (Valladolid)
IV Corps (Lefebvre):
7000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 36 Guns (South of
Tordesillas)
III Corps (Moncey):
24000 Infantry, 5000 Cavalry, 60 Guns (Valladolid)
Figueras Garrison: 3000 Infantry
VII Corps (St-Cyr):
16000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 24 Guns (Figueras)
Chabran’s Division: 6000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 6 Guns
(Hostalrich)
Reille’s Division: 8000 Infantry, 6 Guns (Gerona)
Barcelona Garrison: 2000 Infantry
Rosas Garrison: 1000 Infantry
Grand Headquarters (Napoleon):
12000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 60 Guns (north of Segovia)
Lahoussaye’s and Lorge’s Divisions: 5000 Cavalry, 12 Guns
(south of Aranda)
Latour-Maubourg’s Division: 5000 Cavalry, 6 Guns (north
of Aranda)
VI Corps (Ney):
20000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 42 Guns (east of Salamanca)
V Corps (Mortier):
18000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 36 Guns (east of Salamanca)
Allied Forces:
Cadiz Garrison: 8000 Infantry
IV Army (Elio):
12000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 6 Guns (west of Granada)
Seville Garrison: 4000 Infantry
Malaga Garrison: 2000 Infantry
Huelva Garrison: 3000 Infantry
Army of Andalusia (Castanos):
12000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 6 Guns (south of Salamanca)
Reding’s Division: 2000 Infantry (Ciudad Rodrigo)
Jones’ Division: 2000 Infantry (Salamanca)
La Pena’s Division: 5000 Infantry, 6 Guns (Talavera)
Granada Garrison: 3000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry
West of Granada Garrison: 7000 Infantry
Ciudad Rodrigo’s Garrison: 1000 Infantry
Army of the Centre (Cuesta):
9000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, 12 Guns (north of Tarragona)
Badajoz Garrison: 6000 Infantry
Army of Galicia (Mahy):
26000 Infantry, 54 Guns (Ponferrada)
La Coruna Garrison: 2000 Infantry
Vigo Garrison: 3000 Infantry
Astorga Garrison: 6000 Infantry
Cartagena Garrison: 4000 Infantry
Murcia Garrison: 2000 Infantry
Army of Valencia (Cervellon):
18000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 48 Guns (Bejar)
Valencia Garrison: 1000 Infantry
Army of Catalonia (Palacio):
6000 Infantry, 12 Guns (Caspe)
Tarragona Garrison: 1000 Infantry
Hostalrich Garrison: 1000 Infantry
Tortosa Garrison: 3000 Infantry
Gerona Garrison: 1000 Infantry
British Army (Anstruther - awaiting Wellington):
26000 Infantry, 54 Guns (south of Salamanca)
Hope & Paget’s Divisions: 6000 Infantry, 3000
Cavalry, 12 Guns (Bejar)
Loyal Lusitanian Legion: 3000 Infantry, 6 Guns (east of
Ciudad Rodrigo)
Ferguson & Craddock’s Divisions: 10000 Infantry, 12
Guns (Lisbon)
Gibraltar Garrison: 6000 Infantry
Saturday 11 October 2014
Some Thoughts About Morale and Wargames
Polemarch is one of the most interesting wargaming bloggers in my opinion and in a recent post he was writing about the difficulties of making things concrete for wargames which are nebulous in reality. One of the examples he gave was morale rules - wargame rules have to include rules on morale and by assigning them factors or probabilities in one form or another, then they by definition apply rules to something which is not reliably measurable.
Now, as it happens, there has been a certain amount of interest in this subject in military circles recently and I've read some of the literature on this subject:
The Stress of Battle
The Human Face of War
Brains and Bullets
Battle Studies
On Killing
Men Against Fire
Plus some stuff in military journals and it appears that there are certain factors which can be identified and their importance given a very provisional numerical rating. So I have done a very imperfect summary of the factors identified as making the difference:
Now, as it happens, there has been a certain amount of interest in this subject in military circles recently and I've read some of the literature on this subject:
The Stress of Battle
The Human Face of War
Brains and Bullets
Battle Studies
On Killing
Men Against Fire
Plus some stuff in military journals and it appears that there are certain factors which can be identified and their importance given a very provisional numerical rating. So I have done a very imperfect summary of the factors identified as making the difference:
Some Notes on Morale, or Why Soldiers Don’t Fight
“It is a fact that scattered through the Army there is a great
deal of experience and knowledge of the problems of morale. But it has never been collected or
systematised. Everybody’s opinion
depends on his own experience and observation, which may or may not be
representative.
The result is that any discussion of morale sharply
divides into two stages:
1. The stage of woolly abstractions in which people talk solemnly
of ‘leadership’ and ‘discipline’ or ‘group spirit’ without ever defining the
meaning of these phrases in practice;
And
2. The all-too-concrete stage, in which the whole subject suddenly
degenerates into discussions about supplies of beer.” (Brigadier Nigel Balchin).
What Makes Soldiers Not Fight:
1.
Being Surprised. Surprise seems to be the single greatest
combat multiplier available to a commander. Poor troops who are surprised are almost
inevitably defeated, but all troops are likely to be. Panic and flight are the most likely
outcomes. Obviously surprise wears off
quite quickly. Within limits, troops who
are surprised can be defeated by far inferior forces (numerically).
2.
Being Shocked… Troops in a state of shock are likely to
fight very poorly, if it all, and may put up literally no resistance. This could be achieved by bombardment, aerial
attack, constant attack or defeat(ism).
Units and individuals do recover from shock, sometimes in a relatively
short period, depending on the nature of the shock. Longer-term effects seem to be a feature only
of C20+ warfare (there was nowhere near enough fire to achieve these effects before
that).
3.
…And Being Suppressed. On a tactical level, being suppressed
seems to be a form of the same thing; but at the most basic level i.e. troops
recover from suppression very quickly when the suppressive fire stops. There is an echo of this in the way that the
spirits of allied soldiers at Waterloo improved when they were about to be
attacked by cavalry, as the artillery fire was stopped. Also consider the crews of Tiger tanks who
abandoned their tanks after coming under artillery bombardment or Typhoon
attack.
4.
Lack of Supervision and
Leadership/Compulsion. Soldiers who
are not supervised are not likely to fight well in difficult situations, being
reluctant to close with the enemy or fight as hard for ground. This is not a matter of courage per se
but more a matter of isolation affecting judgement of risk and reward. Conversely, soldiers who are supervised by
higher ranks are much more likely to perform well, even to maximal
standards. This is the basic reason why
anti-tank guns generally outperform tanks in combat: a tank is a lonely,
isolated place and a tank commander is a lonely and isolated individual. The Napoleonic emphasis on the courage of
officers and their leading by personal example clearly taps into the importance
of this. Discipline is another element of this – leaders
need their troops to do what they tell them to do and units without that
discipline are likely to come apart. Troops can sometimes do incredible things simply because the boss is at their shoulder, watching...
5.
Cohesion. Sometimes it is cohesion, sometimes the lack
of it. In large bodies of men operating
together, cohesion, along with leadership/supervision, keeps soldiers in the
ranks and obeying orders. This is why
commanders were reluctant to give up close-order formations. Armies/unit types which do not achieve this
cohesion have trouble getting close to the enemy and will prefer to skirmish. Melee combat between skirmishers is likely to
be a desultory affair, with a couple of extraordinarily motivated individuals
doing all the close-fighting, perhaps dragging a few people with them – so-called
‘Heroic Fighting’, but most of the soldiers will be fighting just outside effective
range (or hanging back even further). In
close order units however, when some men break, the unit’s cohesion will work
against it and the whole unit is likely to rout, as soldiers under no immediate
threat copy the behaviour of those in the unit who are.
6.
Weapon/Equipment Factors. Troops perceiving themselves to have better
weapons than the enemy and their fellows will fight harder. Troops in the reverse situation will fight
less hard. This is particularly so when
troops do not feel they have adequate weapons to respond (so troops without
specific anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons for example – the so-called tank
panic and dive-bomber terror, etc). In general,
this is why troops fear indirect fire and mines/booby-traps more than anything
else.
7.
Confusion. Troops confronted with a variety of different
threats can have difficulty in doing anything at all as they or their
commanders’ brains are overloaded with threats so they can’t think straight.
8.
Being outflanked. Being outflanked, even without being
surprised or shocked or confused (although all of these things are likely), is
more likely to force an enemy to run away/surrender, partly for physical
reasons (can’t bring weapons and immediate reserves to bear), but seems to have
a psychological effect of its own too.
Removing this threat – and the increase of supervision – is the chief
value of the square.
9.
Being given a credible
alternative. If there is a way to
escape imminent death/disaster, then troops will take it. Troops with no credible opportunity to run
away or surrender are likely to fight harder.
10.
Not being a hero. There are some people who naturally fight
harder than others and some who will go quite a way to not fight at all. The majority will respond to leadership and
be dependent upon it. Effective training
and selection can reduce the size of the group reluctant to fight at all.
11.
Aversion. Troops are simply less willing to engage in
combat than supposed, whether from reluctance to hurt others or by abstaining
from activity, hope to discourage enemy activity coming their way. This effect is quite large, particularly at
close ranges or in hand-to-hand combat.
On the other hand, well-trained elite troops not subjected to any
particular effective fire from an enemy who they think will torture or kill them
if they surrender are likely to have an aversion level close to nought. Supervision and cohesion probably help a lot
in pre C20 battles, in the stages where commanders retain control and the
visibility is reasonable.
12.
Struggling to Close with
the Enemy. There appears to be a
range, just outside the effective range of enemy action/fire that people need a
special motivational push to get beyond or to stay fighting at (if they are
defending). Troops that get through this
are more likely to go all the way (to close), or to hold. It appears to be the mechanism that prevented
infantry units clashing in the horse-and-musket era.
13.
Fussing. Generally a
thing in modern combat – prioritizing looking after equipment/weapons etc. rather
than fighting directly. A kind of
displacement activity, but the muskets collected unfired with multiple charges
inside them point to something similar.
May be seen in commanders at all levels in all periods, failing to focus
on the fighting and allowing themselves to be distracted, a relative of
confusion.
14.
Advertising. Troops can be scared into running off or
surrendering if it is made clear to them that something very nasty is coming
their way, but they have an easy way to avoid it – either an easy withdrawal
route or someone kind to surrender too.
Done at key moments then this is almost irresistible.
Obviously there is a lot more to all of this - in particular points 2 and 3 - but the numbers behind it do seem to stack up.
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