Now, as it happens, there has been a certain amount of interest in this subject in military circles recently and I've read some of the literature on this subject:
The Stress of Battle
The Human Face of War
Brains and Bullets
Battle Studies
On Killing
Men Against Fire
Plus some stuff in military journals and it appears that there are certain factors which can be identified and their importance given a very provisional numerical rating. So I have done a very imperfect summary of the factors identified as making the difference:
Some Notes on Morale, or Why Soldiers Don’t Fight
“It is a fact that scattered through the Army there is a great
deal of experience and knowledge of the problems of morale. But it has never been collected or
systematised. Everybody’s opinion
depends on his own experience and observation, which may or may not be
representative.
The result is that any discussion of morale sharply
divides into two stages:
1. The stage of woolly abstractions in which people talk solemnly
of ‘leadership’ and ‘discipline’ or ‘group spirit’ without ever defining the
meaning of these phrases in practice;
And
2. The all-too-concrete stage, in which the whole subject suddenly
degenerates into discussions about supplies of beer.” (Brigadier Nigel Balchin).
What Makes Soldiers Not Fight:
1.
Being Surprised. Surprise seems to be the single greatest
combat multiplier available to a commander. Poor troops who are surprised are almost
inevitably defeated, but all troops are likely to be. Panic and flight are the most likely
outcomes. Obviously surprise wears off
quite quickly. Within limits, troops who
are surprised can be defeated by far inferior forces (numerically).
2.
Being Shocked… Troops in a state of shock are likely to
fight very poorly, if it all, and may put up literally no resistance. This could be achieved by bombardment, aerial
attack, constant attack or defeat(ism).
Units and individuals do recover from shock, sometimes in a relatively
short period, depending on the nature of the shock. Longer-term effects seem to be a feature only
of C20+ warfare (there was nowhere near enough fire to achieve these effects before
that).
3.
…And Being Suppressed. On a tactical level, being suppressed
seems to be a form of the same thing; but at the most basic level i.e. troops
recover from suppression very quickly when the suppressive fire stops. There is an echo of this in the way that the
spirits of allied soldiers at Waterloo improved when they were about to be
attacked by cavalry, as the artillery fire was stopped. Also consider the crews of Tiger tanks who
abandoned their tanks after coming under artillery bombardment or Typhoon
attack.
4.
Lack of Supervision and
Leadership/Compulsion. Soldiers who
are not supervised are not likely to fight well in difficult situations, being
reluctant to close with the enemy or fight as hard for ground. This is not a matter of courage per se
but more a matter of isolation affecting judgement of risk and reward. Conversely, soldiers who are supervised by
higher ranks are much more likely to perform well, even to maximal
standards. This is the basic reason why
anti-tank guns generally outperform tanks in combat: a tank is a lonely,
isolated place and a tank commander is a lonely and isolated individual. The Napoleonic emphasis on the courage of
officers and their leading by personal example clearly taps into the importance
of this. Discipline is another element of this – leaders
need their troops to do what they tell them to do and units without that
discipline are likely to come apart. Troops can sometimes do incredible things simply because the boss is at their shoulder, watching...
5.
Cohesion. Sometimes it is cohesion, sometimes the lack
of it. In large bodies of men operating
together, cohesion, along with leadership/supervision, keeps soldiers in the
ranks and obeying orders. This is why
commanders were reluctant to give up close-order formations. Armies/unit types which do not achieve this
cohesion have trouble getting close to the enemy and will prefer to skirmish. Melee combat between skirmishers is likely to
be a desultory affair, with a couple of extraordinarily motivated individuals
doing all the close-fighting, perhaps dragging a few people with them – so-called
‘Heroic Fighting’, but most of the soldiers will be fighting just outside effective
range (or hanging back even further). In
close order units however, when some men break, the unit’s cohesion will work
against it and the whole unit is likely to rout, as soldiers under no immediate
threat copy the behaviour of those in the unit who are.
6.
Weapon/Equipment Factors. Troops perceiving themselves to have better
weapons than the enemy and their fellows will fight harder. Troops in the reverse situation will fight
less hard. This is particularly so when
troops do not feel they have adequate weapons to respond (so troops without
specific anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons for example – the so-called tank
panic and dive-bomber terror, etc). In general,
this is why troops fear indirect fire and mines/booby-traps more than anything
else.
7.
Confusion. Troops confronted with a variety of different
threats can have difficulty in doing anything at all as they or their
commanders’ brains are overloaded with threats so they can’t think straight.
8.
Being outflanked. Being outflanked, even without being
surprised or shocked or confused (although all of these things are likely), is
more likely to force an enemy to run away/surrender, partly for physical
reasons (can’t bring weapons and immediate reserves to bear), but seems to have
a psychological effect of its own too.
Removing this threat – and the increase of supervision – is the chief
value of the square.
9.
Being given a credible
alternative. If there is a way to
escape imminent death/disaster, then troops will take it. Troops with no credible opportunity to run
away or surrender are likely to fight harder.
10.
Not being a hero. There are some people who naturally fight
harder than others and some who will go quite a way to not fight at all. The majority will respond to leadership and
be dependent upon it. Effective training
and selection can reduce the size of the group reluctant to fight at all.
11.
Aversion. Troops are simply less willing to engage in
combat than supposed, whether from reluctance to hurt others or by abstaining
from activity, hope to discourage enemy activity coming their way. This effect is quite large, particularly at
close ranges or in hand-to-hand combat.
On the other hand, well-trained elite troops not subjected to any
particular effective fire from an enemy who they think will torture or kill them
if they surrender are likely to have an aversion level close to nought. Supervision and cohesion probably help a lot
in pre C20 battles, in the stages where commanders retain control and the
visibility is reasonable.
12.
Struggling to Close with
the Enemy. There appears to be a
range, just outside the effective range of enemy action/fire that people need a
special motivational push to get beyond or to stay fighting at (if they are
defending). Troops that get through this
are more likely to go all the way (to close), or to hold. It appears to be the mechanism that prevented
infantry units clashing in the horse-and-musket era.
13.
Fussing. Generally a
thing in modern combat – prioritizing looking after equipment/weapons etc. rather
than fighting directly. A kind of
displacement activity, but the muskets collected unfired with multiple charges
inside them point to something similar.
May be seen in commanders at all levels in all periods, failing to focus
on the fighting and allowing themselves to be distracted, a relative of
confusion.
14.
Advertising. Troops can be scared into running off or
surrendering if it is made clear to them that something very nasty is coming
their way, but they have an easy way to avoid it – either an easy withdrawal
route or someone kind to surrender too.
Done at key moments then this is almost irresistible.
Obviously there is a lot more to all of this - in particular points 2 and 3 - but the numbers behind it do seem to stack up.
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