Peninsular Campaign - Summary of Forces, End of December 1808

Imperial Forces:

VIII Corps (Junot):

16000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 42 Guns (Pamplona)

II Corps (Soult):

28000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, 30 Guns (Besieging Astorga)

Caffarelli’s Division: 4000 Infantry, 6 Guns (West of Palencia)

Burgos Garrison: 2000 Infantry

Army of Spain (Joseph Napoleon):

6000 Guardsmen, 2000 Guard Cavaly, 12 Guns (Tordesillas)

San Sebastian Garrison: 2000 Infantry

Pamplona Garrison: 2000 Infantry

Tudela Garrison: 1000 Infantry

Zaragoza Garrison: 4000 Infantry

I Corps (Marchand):

16000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, 48 Guns (Valladolid)

IV Corps (Lefebvre):

7000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 36 Guns (South of Tordesillas)

III Corps (Moncey):

24000 Infantry, 5000 Cavalry, 60 Guns (Valladolid)

Figueras Garrison: 3000 Infantry

VII Corps (St-Cyr):

16000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 24 Guns (Figueras)

Chabran’s Division: 6000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 6 Guns (Hostalrich)

Reille’s Division: 8000 Infantry, 6 Guns (Gerona)

Barcelona Garrison: 2000 Infantry

Rosas Garrison: 1000 Infantry

Grand Headquarters (Napoleon):

12000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 60 Guns (north of Segovia)

Lahoussaye’s and Lorge’s Divisions: 5000 Cavalry, 12 Guns (south of Aranda)

Latour-Maubourg’s Division: 5000 Cavalry, 6 Guns (north of Aranda)

VI Corps (Ney):

20000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 42 Guns (east of Salamanca)

V Corps (Mortier):

18000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 36 Guns (east of Salamanca)

Allied Forces:

Cadiz Garrison: 8000 Infantry

IV Army (Elio):

12000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 6 Guns (west of Granada)

Seville Garrison: 4000 Infantry

Malaga Garrison: 2000 Infantry

Huelva Garrison: 3000 Infantry

Army of Andalusia (Castanos):

12000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry, 6 Guns (south of Salamanca)

Reding’s Division: 2000 Infantry (Ciudad Rodrigo)

Jones’ Division: 2000 Infantry (Salamanca)

La Pena’s Division: 5000 Infantry, 6 Guns (Talavera)

Granada Garrison: 3000 Infantry, 2000 Cavalry

West of Granada Garrison: 7000 Infantry

Ciudad Rodrigo’s Garrison: 1000 Infantry

Army of the Centre (Cuesta):

9000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, 12 Guns (north of Tarragona)

Badajoz Garrison: 6000 Infantry

Army of Galicia (Mahy):

26000 Infantry, 54 Guns (Ponferrada)

La Coruna Garrison: 2000 Infantry

Vigo Garrison: 3000 Infantry

Astorga Garrison: 6000 Infantry

Cartagena Garrison: 4000 Infantry

Murcia Garrison: 2000 Infantry

Army of Valencia (Cervellon):

18000 Infantry, 1000 Cavalry, 48 Guns (Bejar)

Valencia Garrison: 1000 Infantry

Army of Catalonia (Palacio):

6000 Infantry, 12 Guns (Caspe)

Tarragona Garrison: 1000 Infantry

Hostalrich Garrison: 1000 Infantry

Tortosa Garrison: 3000 Infantry

Gerona Garrison: 1000 Infantry

British Army (Anstruther - awaiting Wellington):

26000 Infantry, 54 Guns (south of Salamanca)

Hope & Paget’s Divisions: 6000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, 12 Guns (Bejar)

Loyal Lusitanian Legion: 3000 Infantry, 6 Guns (east of Ciudad Rodrigo)

Ferguson & Craddock’s Divisions: 10000 Infantry, 12 Guns (Lisbon)

Gibraltar Garrison: 6000 Infantry

Some Thoughts About Morale and Wargames

Polemarch is one of the most interesting wargaming bloggers in my opinion and in a recent post he was writing about the difficulties of making things concrete for wargames which are nebulous in reality.  One of the examples he gave was morale rules - wargame rules have to include rules on morale and by assigning them factors or probabilities in one form or another, then they by definition apply rules to something which is not reliably measurable.

Now, as it happens, there has been a certain amount of interest in this subject in military circles recently and I've read some of the literature on this subject:

The Stress of Battle
The Human Face of War
Brains and Bullets
Battle Studies
On Killing
Men Against Fire

Plus some stuff in military journals and it appears that there are certain factors which can be identified and their importance given a very provisional numerical rating.  So I have done a very imperfect summary of the factors identified as making the difference:

Some Notes on Morale, or Why Soldiers Don’t Fight

“It is a fact that scattered through the Army there is a great deal of experience and knowledge of the problems of morale.  But it has never been collected or systematised.  Everybody’s opinion depends on his own experience and observation, which may or may not be representative.

The result is that any discussion of morale sharply divides into two stages:

1.      The stage of woolly abstractions in which people talk solemnly of ‘leadership’ and ‘discipline’ or ‘group spirit’ without ever defining the meaning of these phrases in practice;

And

2.      The all-too-concrete stage, in which the whole subject suddenly degenerates into discussions about supplies of beer.” (Brigadier Nigel Balchin).

What Makes Soldiers Not Fight:

1.                  Being Surprised.  Surprise seems to be the single greatest combat multiplier available to a commander.  Poor troops who are surprised are almost inevitably defeated, but all troops are likely to be.  Panic and flight are the most likely outcomes.  Obviously surprise wears off quite quickly.  Within limits, troops who are surprised can be defeated by far inferior forces (numerically).

2.                  Being Shocked…  Troops in a state of shock are likely to fight very poorly, if it all, and may put up literally no resistance.  This could be achieved by bombardment, aerial attack, constant attack or defeat(ism).  Units and individuals do recover from shock, sometimes in a relatively short period, depending on the nature of the shock.   Longer-term effects seem to be a feature only of C20+ warfare (there was nowhere near enough fire to achieve these effects before that).

3.                  …And Being Suppressed.  On a tactical level, being suppressed seems to be a form of the same thing; but at the most basic level i.e. troops recover from suppression very quickly when the suppressive fire stops.  There is an echo of this in the way that the spirits of allied soldiers at Waterloo improved when they were about to be attacked by cavalry, as the artillery fire was stopped.  Also consider the crews of Tiger tanks who abandoned their tanks after coming under artillery bombardment or Typhoon attack.

4.                  Lack of Supervision and Leadership/Compulsion.  Soldiers who are not supervised are not likely to fight well in difficult situations, being reluctant to close with the enemy or fight as hard for ground.  This is not a matter of courage per se but more a matter of isolation affecting judgement of risk and reward.  Conversely, soldiers who are supervised by higher ranks are much more likely to perform well, even to maximal standards.  This is the basic reason why anti-tank guns generally outperform tanks in combat: a tank is a lonely, isolated place and a tank commander is a lonely and isolated individual.  The Napoleonic emphasis on the courage of officers and their leading by personal example clearly taps into the importance of this.   Discipline is another element of this – leaders need their troops to do what they tell them to do and units without that discipline are likely to come apart.  Troops can sometimes do incredible things simply because the boss is at their shoulder, watching...

5.                  Cohesion.  Sometimes it is cohesion, sometimes the lack of it.  In large bodies of men operating together, cohesion, along with leadership/supervision, keeps soldiers in the ranks and obeying orders.  This is why commanders were reluctant to give up close-order formations.  Armies/unit types which do not achieve this cohesion have trouble getting close to the enemy and will prefer to skirmish.  Melee combat between skirmishers is likely to be a desultory affair, with a couple of extraordinarily motivated individuals doing all the close-fighting, perhaps dragging a few people with them – so-called ‘Heroic Fighting’, but most of the soldiers will be fighting just outside effective range (or hanging back even further).  In close order units however, when some men break, the unit’s cohesion will work against it and the whole unit is likely to rout, as soldiers under no immediate threat copy the behaviour of those in the unit who are.

6.                  Weapon/Equipment Factors.  Troops perceiving themselves to have better weapons than the enemy and their fellows will fight harder.  Troops in the reverse situation will fight less hard.  This is particularly so when troops do not feel they have adequate weapons to respond (so troops without specific anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons for example – the so-called tank panic and dive-bomber terror, etc).  In general, this is why troops fear indirect fire and mines/booby-traps more than anything else.

7.                  Confusion.  Troops confronted with a variety of different threats can have difficulty in doing anything at all as they or their commanders’ brains are overloaded with threats so they can’t think straight.

8.                  Being outflanked.  Being outflanked, even without being surprised or shocked or confused (although all of these things are likely), is more likely to force an enemy to run away/surrender, partly for physical reasons (can’t bring weapons and immediate reserves to bear), but seems to have a psychological effect of its own too.  Removing this threat – and the increase of supervision – is the chief value of the square.

9.                  Being given a credible alternative.  If there is a way to escape imminent death/disaster, then troops will take it.  Troops with no credible opportunity to run away or surrender are likely to fight harder.

10.             Not being a hero.  There are some people who naturally fight harder than others and some who will go quite a way to not fight at all.  The majority will respond to leadership and be dependent upon it.  Effective training and selection can reduce the size of the group reluctant to fight at all. 

11.             Aversion.  Troops are simply less willing to engage in combat than supposed, whether from reluctance to hurt others or by abstaining from activity, hope to discourage enemy activity coming their way.  This effect is quite large, particularly at close ranges or in hand-to-hand combat.  On the other hand, well-trained elite troops not subjected to any particular effective fire from an enemy who they think will torture or kill them if they surrender are likely to have an aversion level close to nought.  Supervision and cohesion probably help a lot in pre C20 battles, in the stages where commanders retain control and the visibility is reasonable.

12.             Struggling to Close with the Enemy.  There appears to be a range, just outside the effective range of enemy action/fire that people need a special motivational push to get beyond or to stay fighting at (if they are defending).  Troops that get through this are more likely to go all the way (to close), or to hold.  It appears to be the mechanism that prevented infantry units clashing in the horse-and-musket era.

13.             Fussing. Generally a thing in modern combat – prioritizing looking after equipment/weapons etc. rather than fighting directly.  A kind of displacement activity, but the muskets collected unfired with multiple charges inside them point to something similar.  May be seen in commanders at all levels in all periods, failing to focus on the fighting and allowing themselves to be distracted, a relative of confusion.

14.             Advertising.  Troops can be scared into running off or surrendering if it is made clear to them that something very nasty is coming their way, but they have an easy way to avoid it – either an easy withdrawal route or someone kind to surrender too.  Done at key moments then this is almost irresistible.  

Obviously there is a lot more to all of this - in particular points 2 and 3 - but the numbers behind it do seem to stack up.

Neil Thomas' Wargaming: An Introduction - A Review

Wargaming: An Introduction

Neil Thomas sets out to explain what wargaming is and present to the newcomer enough information to get started playing.  He sets out a brief history of wargaming, in which he makes clear his preference for rules using ‘a simple process but (obtaining) historically valid outcomes’. He then briefly discusses which periods of history to play, which figures to obtain and how to paint the figures, and prepare terrain for them to fight over.  All of this is short and to the point.

The author then looks at various wargaming periods: Ancients (covering 3000BC-1450AD), Pike and Shot (covering the period 1450-1650), Napoleonics, the American Civil War, Colonial and World War Two.  When covering each topic, he very briefly describes what he considers to be the main features of the period and the main troop types involved.  He then presents a short, simple set of rules incorporating the features and troop types he has just defined, and finally gives a number of examples of wargames armies set in the period, with the number of units of each type in a given army.

The author rounds off the book with an example game (set in the Napoleonic period), a set of contact details for various useful resources (book sellers, figure manufacturers etc.) and an index.

The rules themselves are short and simple.  Most infantry and cavalry units consist of four bases (some infantry units in various periods may consist of six or eight bases).  All periods share a similar format: a charge sequence, movement, shooting, melee combat and finally morale checks.  There are no command and control rules and the game follow an IGOUGO format.  Movement is reduced in some circumstances, but light troops are more flexible.  There are various special rules for each unit type to give each of them different abilities.  The combat mechanic consists of die rolls against a target number (e.g. 4-6 to inflict one hit), with units getting extra dice depending on the match up (so heavy cavalry fighting light cavalry might get two dice rather than one for each base in combat) and saving rolls to negate that hit in certain circumstances, e.g. if they are wearing armour, or in cover.   Every four ‘hits’ translate into the loss of a base from the affected unit.  Morale is entirely based on casualties: in some circumstances, units roll to see whether they suffer additional losses each time the unit is reduced in strength.  The game is over when either army is reduced to two units remaining.

The sample army lists are simple and are based on an army consisting (basically) of eight distinct units.  These are defined according to the troop types he defined earlier and are also defined by one of three morale classes (Elite, Average and Levy).  For example, the Swedish Army for the Thirty Years War consists of:

3-5 Infantry units (each of 2 bases of Pikemen, 4 bases of musketeers); 1-3 Artillery units (1 cannon); 2-4 units of Horse (consisting of 4 bases of cavalry); 0-1 units of Dragoons (mounted infantry).   All units are classed as ‘elite’.

Thomas also suggests that battles involving them are played on green baseboard with 1-3 terrain pieces placed on it, either hills, woods or rivers.

The Swedes have a special rule to allow for the effect of their battalion guns, and a special rule suggesting that the Swedish player experiment with using an army of six rather than eight units, since the Swedes were often outnumbered.

The rules give a good, fast game – my solo games typically take between an hour and ninety minutes to complete.  They should be understandable by most newcomers with minimal guidance.  The rules are easily modifiable by changing modifiers or adding special rules in accordance with differing views on the period.  For instance, the Napoleonic rules forbid squares to move but I think they should be allowed to advance slowly.  Making the change doesn’t break the rules at all.  The army lists are quite basic and stereotypical and are not particularly balanced in all cases, although the author explicitly doesn’t see this as a problem.  Naturally, they are far from comprehensive but a little research (or alternatively cribbing the army lists found in the free version of DBA) should supply any gaps.  There are no rigid basing requirements so the rules should work with most existing collections and the armies are small, so newcomers should be able to collect sufficient figures easily enough.  So a  Mongol Army for example, could consist of anything between 12 – 48 heavy cavalry figures and 32 – 56 light cavalry figures; a Spanish Napoleonic Army will consist of 80 line infantry figures, 16 grenadiers, 12 cavalry, 12 dragoons, an artillery piece and a general.

So, what are the problems with this book?  The photographs do not match the suggested basing system, they are ‘eye-candy’ culled mainly from the archives of Miniature Wargames magazine.  The rules are easy to follow, but they do allow for the odd situation when the players will have to rule for themselves over a difficulty and move on.  I have played a reasonable number of games but not a vast number – I do have a feeling that someone with enough patience could ‘crack’ the game, at least for certain match-ups.  By the wide-ranging nature of the rules, lots of troop types and areas of conflict are ignored, although the style of the rules allows for easy modification – some players have put on lots of additional information on the unofficial support group. The writing style is generally fine, but does contain sentences such as “It should also go without saying that the desire to abolish slavery gave the USA undoubted moral superiority over the Confederacy” and “Sadly for these lager louts of the ancient world (i.e. Gauls and Germans), personal valour did not fare well against Roman discipline…if being bashed by the Romans becomes too uninviting aprospect, inter-tribal conflicts (generally over such weighty political issues as who spilt whose pint, and who was looking at whom in a funny way) can provide interesting games”, which some readers might find slightly out-of-place or irritating.  The preface by former Miniature Wargames editor Iain Dickie is quite idiosyncratic too.

The rules do not worry about accurate scaling at all, in terms of both figure/man ratios and time/distance ratios.  The author aims instead for a kind of internal consistency, which he seems to achieve.   However, for players of the Napoleonic game, the mechanics, distances and aesthetic resemble a game where every unit is a battalion/regiment/battery; whilst the mechanics of the WW2 game suggest a 1:1 model to man ratio.  In neither case is this explicit though: a ‘unit’ could be anything the player likes.

Neil Thomas has also published books specifically aimed at the Ancient period and the Napoleonic Wars.  The rules are similar to those presented in this book, but more refined and contain a greater number of army lists.  I have played both, and in both cases slightly prefer the rules in the period-specific books.  There is not that much difference though, so if you want to try lots of different periods or are an inveterate tinkerer who thinks the best place for an army list is under a wonky table leg, then you are probably better off with this one.

I’d recommend this to beginners wanting a set of easy, well-thought out rules to begin playing with and to more experienced gamers looking for a consciously simple game.

For an example of the game in action, see here:

http://hereticalgaming.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/late-c15-clash.html

Although note that I use my existing single-base units rather than the scheme suggested in the rules and use counters to mark losses in hits and bases.  It works fine.

Late C15 Clash

I played out one of the scenarios from 'Scenarios for All Ages' today, using my 6mm Wars of the Roses armies and the 'Pike and Shot' rules from Neil Thomas' Wargaming: An Introduction.  The forces were picked from the options in the French and Spanish army lists for the Italian Wars in the rules, named as 'Bretonnia' and 'Estalia' respectively for this imaginary battle.

The initial set-up: the 'Bretonnians' on the southern (near) side of the river, the 'Estalians' on the northern bank, both marching E to W.  It is a little hard to tell, but there are hillson both sides of the watercourse.

Closer in: the Bretonnians' order of march: 'Mounted Archers', Crossbowmen, Pikemen, Gendarmes, more Crossbowmen, Artillery, Pikemen, Crossbowmen.  The Estalians: Ginetes, Gendarmes, Arquebusiers, Halberdier x2, Artillery, Halberdiers, Arquebusiers.

The Bretonnian 'Mounted Archers' advance through the town, whilst the Main Guard is still to the South.  Pikemen and Crossbowmen prepare to ford the river.  Estalian cavalry is racing westwards to secure the westernmost crossing (left).

First blood: Estalian Arquebusiers and Artillery hit the Bretonnian 'Mounted Archers' (i.e. less well-arnoured cavalry).  For those who know the rules, a blue counter represents a 'hit', a red counter represents a lost base.  Bretonnian reserves are rushing up to support, however.

But not quickly enough!  A combination of shot and steel destroy the cavalrymen.  Both sides contine their deployment.

And battle joined in earnest - the Bretonnian gendarmes are causing havoc amongst the Estalian arquebusiers, who are hanging on grimly; just grimly enough to let Estalian infantry hit the gendarmes in the flank.  The Bretonnian crossbowmen do themselves great credit with the accuracy of their fire against the Estalian infantry,

Change of scene: Bretonnian infantry and artillery heading west meet Estalian cavalry who have already crossed the river.

The profusion of red counters reflects the profusion of blood spilled in the central melee: Pikemen support the gendarmes, but who are in turn engaged by Estalian infantry reserves.  Estalian arquebusiers, having been outshot by the crossbowmen, advance to come to grips.

Back west: that Estalian light cavalry is causing some damage to those Pikemen, who simpy can't deal with javelin-throwing light cavalry.

The beginning of the end for the Bretonnians in the East: the Pikemen are destroyed and they are now outnumbered 2:1...

Slightly closer-in.

The pikemen have suffered greatly, but the Estalian gendarmes have been shot-up badly and haven't inflicted enough damage to quickly see-off those Bretonnian crossbowmen.

The pikemen crash into the gendarmes' flank and destroy them in short order.  More Bretonnian crossbowmen make life difficult - indeed, in some cases, impossible

The coup de grace on the Bretonnian right!

Victorious Estalians march through the town and capture the bridge!

The Bretonnian infantry have seen off the Estalian cavalry, who retire over the river.

There was quite a long period of manoeuvre, where the Estalians marched up through the village then re-deployed to meet the remaining Bretonnians.  Their efforts to counter the Estalian mover were badly hindered by skirmishing Ginetes to their rear.

It is about to be all over...only exceptional shooting can save the Bretonnians now...

|Another view.

But not to be! The Bretonnian artillery is captured and more crossbowmen are routed...it is all over.

A close-up.

Game Notes: A thoroughly enjoyable solo game using Neil Thomas' 'Pike and Shot' rules with only a couple of scenario-specific rules.  The main one was that artillery could moves as infantry on the roads and in the open until it fired, where it had to remain static for the rest of the game.  The rules worked fine and the game was quick: it took about an hour and a quarter, spread over three short sessions.  Every time I play them I remember how much I like them!  They give a very pure game, as the rules are so simple.  I didn't use any additional rules for solitaire play, just asked myself what I thought the best move was.  Obviously this rules out surprise, but it introduces a more chess-like challenge which is just as engaging in its way.  I am familiar with the rules generally, as I have played many games with this or similar of his rulesets, but my lack of familiarity with the rules led me to make several questionable decisions!! The scenario used was 'Scenario 25: Chance Encounters', as two sides encounter each other suddenly after the lifiting of a mist on their way to secure three river crossings.

I hope to write a proper book review for these rules in the near future .